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Abstract  
 
The question: “How much of biological evolution based theories, as they are understood 
presently, apply to human behaviour?” is highly controversial and perhaps highly politicized 
as well. The inference that human beings are evolutionarily programmed to have urges 
toward aggression, rape, murder, adultery, genocide and so on is a politically rejected idea 
within the social sciences. To be politically correct those who use evolutionary framework do 
claim that people can learn or have capacity for self restraint. However it is not clearly 
understood, how such restraint can possibly evolve within the evolutionary framework. This 
paper argues that the missing link that explains such behaviour is the concept of extended 
identity. How extended identity can evolve, following the framework of selfish gene, is 
explained by integrating theories related to selfish gene, institutional analysis, information 
economics and social capital literature. Archaeological evidence from evolutionary cognition 
is also used to show that such evolution could happen 4 million years ago (MYA).    
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Introduction  
 
Following the path breaking systematic introduction of the concept of evolution by Darwin 
(1872) to explain the evolution complex design in the form of living things and further 
refinement of Darwinian ideas by Neo-Darwinians like Smith (1982 and 1988), Hamilton and 
Axelrod (1981) and others, the idea of biological evolution based on gene selection is a well 
accepted scientific theory within natural sciences. Those ideas are reviewed in detail and 
robustly summarized, by Dawkins’s (1982, 1986, 2006), within metaphors of selfish gene and 
extended phenotype. The idea being that selfish genes compete for survival as they are 
expressed by their phenotype. Phenotype is the functional body of the genes made by 
complex interaction of large matrix of genes as expressed by existing environment (Dawkins 
1982, 1986, 2006). Those theories are well accepted theories within biology in particular and 
natural sciences in general.  
 
Nonetheless, when Sociobiology was introduced by Wilson (1980) as evolutionary analysis 
of social animals’ behaviour, including humans, it did face highly politicized attack coming 
from many social scientists and some evolutionary biologist (see Wilson, 1976; Pinker, 1997; 
Platek and Shackelford, 2009; Alcock, 2001). The problem partially was because some 
evolutionary stable behaviour like rape, aggression, genocide, adultery, infanticide and so on, 
which are found to be naturally inherited urges, are classified as immoral ‘scientific’ results 
generated by the elite ruling class (Alcock, 2001). Partially it was also because human 
behaviour does not seem to be consistent with those theories in all cases. For example, 
Alcock (2001) stated that, first, what is natural may not necessarily be moral. Fair enough. 
Second, he insisted that humans have moral faculty, which can enable them to restrain their 
immoral biological drives. However, Alcock somehow is not able to explain how such moral 
restraint or capacity to show such restraint can evolve in the first place. This clearly implies 
there is something missing in biological evolution as is understood now. Another Example is 
Pinker (1997) who insisted that humans have different competing mental schemas, some 
leading towards short term gains and others looking from long term goals. As a result, it is 
possible that restraints can come from schemes which are long term goal oriented. This is 
better, but it will not explain the common occurrence of internalized morality within 
humanity. Humans do self restrain, without any cost and benefit analysis, from doing what 
they consider is immoral, unfair, unethical and so on. That is why Pinker’s approach cannot 
fully explain all dominant human behaviours. The good question is: where do we stand now?                            
 
We have proven theories which are path breaking not only in terms of what they are able to 
explain within biological evolution and social evolution, but also in terms of our evolutionary 
understanding of human mind and human cognition (for detail review of literature, see 
Alcock, 2001; Pinker, 1997; Platek and Shackelford, 2009; Buss, 2005) following the ground 
breaking works of both Wilson (1985), within Sociobiology, and Tooby & Cosmides (1987), 
within evolutionary psychology. However, their ideas are not only mostly ignored in wider 
social sciences, but also their advocates may even end up being punished through negative 
campaign, low status and lack of promotion (Alcock, 2001). This is basically unscientific 
behaviour and the solution should be to follow the scientific method than trying to politicize 
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scientific ideas. It is like exchanging sun for candle, when scientists end up politicizing the 
scientific game. This paper will try to follow a scientific approach to show that both sides 
could be wrong and the truth could be found in the middle.   
 
The paper introduces the idea of extended identity and explains how such extended identity 
can evolve following the idea of selfish gene and extended phenotype. Furthermore, it offers 
explanations on how such hypothesis can give a better understanding about human reality 
from evolutionary point of view. It is to be noted that hypotheses used in the write-up are 
presented with supporting evidences. The paper concludes following presentation on 
implications for humanity and natural sciences.            
 
Extended identity as special case of extended phenotype 
 
What is the problem with what we know? 
 
The evolutionary theory of Darwin (1872), which focuses on selection based on selfish 
organism, was challenged by wider observation of altruistic behaviour among organisms and 
especially among humans (Dawkins, 2006). In order to explain those deviations, the focus of 
evolutionary analysis turned toward group selections. The problem is: since group selection is 
evolutionary unstable, evolution cannot possibly work at group selection level (ibid). To 
solve this problem Neo-Darwinians focused on gene selection, which is found to be highly 
consistent and empirically strong theory when checked against non-human living things. In 
this case, altruism will be a function of blood relationship. Their conclusion, the more related 
phenotypes are the more altruistic behaviour will be observed, is not only widely proven (see 
Dawkins, 2006) within non-human living things, but also even within human beings who live 
by forging (see Sahlins, 1972). This is well summarized by idea of selfish genes that compete 
for survival, as expressed by their extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982, 1986, 2006). 
 
Moreover the game theory based analysis of Hamilton and Axelrod (1981) and Axelrod 
(1984) did show that cooperative behaviour in the form of tit-for-tat or other strategies can 
possibly invade, dominate and can be even be evolutionary stable against alien invaders, 
under some conditions. The conditions for evolutionary stability are: the end of the game 
should be unknown; the future should not be highly discounted and the overall benefit of 
mutual cooperation should be very high compared to any other strategy (see Axelrod, 1984). 
The condition for initial invasion of cooperative behaviour is either the cost of being cheated 
have to be very low compared to gain of cooperation or invasion has to happen at cluster 
level than single phenotype’s gene (ibid).    
 
Based on those findings significant behaviours of plants and animals are explained within 
Sociobiology (see Wilson, 1980; Alcock, 2001). Moreover assuming brain is nothing but a 
conditional thinker which looks for clues on environment to choose the right action, Alcock 
(2001) concludes that the human brain is nothing but the same brain with more complex 
conditional rules. The conclusion was that human beings can easily be studied like other 
animals, using the same approaches used within Sociobiology. Pinker (1997), based on 
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accumulated work within evolutionary psychology (see Buss, 2005) and evolutionary 
cognitive neuron science (see Platek and Shackelford, 2009), concluded that the human brain 
is different. The reason given is that, there are conditional rules or common sense rules which 
were adaptive to our hunter and gatherer ancestries as domain specific rules that are being 
used as built in syntax on programming human mind from childhood to adult hood. Those 
built in syntaxes are culturally expressed and their domains within current humanity are 
elastic enough to generate satisfaction from arts, science, money making and other cultural 
expressions (Pinker, 1997). Such argument seems plausible but may not be adequate enough 
to explain why such elasticity becomes adaptable, since in face of high competitive pressure, 
it can causes huge fitness cost by being too elastic. That is why it can only evolve after the 
competitive pressure is minimized. Based on Geary (2009) the relevant time period will be 
since 20, 000 years; which is not adequate time enough to explain its dominance within 
humanity. Moreover such a theory does not allow for existence of internalized morality, 
where people self restrain from doing what they think are wrong, unfair or immoral without 
any cost and benefit analysis.    
  
The main problem of those theories is twofold- first, they failed to explain the evolution of 
complex morality in general and they failed to explain clearly how complex human 
civilization can become possible. It is clear human beings have tendency toward suicide, 
genocide, infanticide, aggression, rape and so on, but human beings also have high tendency 
to self restrain not only when the long term cost is high, say prison or social sanction (attack) 
that can follow, as stated by Pinker (1997) but also mainly by internalized morality. 
Moreover, humans do give up their biological fitness to search for some superficial human 
goal like scientific truth, innovation, artistic expression, national pride, success of a football 
team and soon, even at cost of their fitness. In fact Pinker (1997) and Alcock (2001) did 
clearly claim that each is less interested about their biological fitness as a person. How such 
mind set is able to evolve is an important question, which needs clear answer. Those facts 
clearly demonstrate that something is still missing from existing evolutionary theories.           
                    
The missing link we are trying to explore here is humans have a mindset which can see itself 
not as fixed conditional rule executer but as end by itself. This basically means our mind (the 
human mind) can define its own goals independent of biological fitness. This is self evident 
to any layman, but evolutionary explanation for its existence should be given. There is 
adaptive advantage to evolution of such mindset once we take imperfect information and 
asymmetric information into consideration in the game of selfish genes. In the evolutionary 
game theory of neo-Darwinians, information about defection and cooperation is assumed to 
be conveyed without any cost. We know mindset works with domain specific rules or 
schemata or models and as a result there is always the probability of making a wrong 
inference. Moreover in some settings, the cost of collecting the necessary clues to make 
inference could be very high resulting in less than optimal clues being collected. This could 
happen if the fitness cost of information is greater than the fitness benefit of that information.  
 
But most importantly when two phenotypes make gene centric choice in cooperative game 
with incomplete information and imperfect model, it will make cooperation less possible. 
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This is because information is conveyed by action that will lead to self sustaining chaotic 
mutual defection. For instance, if a man suspects his wife cheating on him, leading him to 
start drinking, she will become angry at him and may even start cheating on him because of 
emotional starvation. As a result, the man might become aggressive towards her and she may 
demand for a divorce. It is possible she was not cheating in the first place but the husband 
may not have the information and he may lack the right schema to understand the information 
to make right prediction. These are concepts adapted from information economics (see 
Stieglitz, 2002 for review). It is clear as the mind become very complex and the number of 
over lapping domain specific models become large in number, such problems will get much 
worse. In other words, human beings, more than all other animals, are expected to be highly 
exposed to such problems in playing cooperative games. The million dollar question is: what 
is the solution?   
 
Possible solution to our knowledge gap  
 
The solution is trust complemented by prediction and sanction! By observing the behaviour 
of an agent for some time one develops trust on some agents that they will be trustworthy in 
the future. As result the agent does not need to collect large set of information to make 
cooperation with trusted agents possible. However trust will change the mind for once and for 
all, if avoidance of chaotic mutual defection is very important. The mind will see the trusted 
phenotypes and its own genes’ phenotype as one social group with unified common goal, 
which is also the goal of the mind. This implies the mind have to suppress its own selfish 
motives and have to promote collective goals. Indirectly the mind must have its own 
extended social identity and its own goals. However in case breach happens, one will use 
either personal or collective sanction to minimize moral hazard problem. To minimize the 
problem of adversely selecting cheaters, one will use prediction. To minimize the problem of 
moral hazard fear of sanction will be also used. This will minimize not only the information 
collection cost but also will minimize the occurrence of chaotic mutual defection that can 
happen when every phenotype is gene centric.  
 
Reliable information about behaviour should be hard to access without high cost before and 
at the cooperation time, but must be cheaply available at sanction time for this process to 
work. For example, a retailer may not be able to assess the quality of large quantities of grain 
sold to him/her by wholesale traders; but the information is easily accessible when retailing 
the grain. By the same token, a lender may not know if a borrower is going to pay back in 
advance but he/she can easily observe when default happens; or in the middle of a group 
fight, it may be costly trying to observe who is doing what, but it will be easy to identify who 
was the hero and who was the free rider after the fight is over. In essence, timing and nature 
of information make it costly at some point and time, but cheap at other times to collect 
information, which make trust and sanction possible.                                                   
 
If prediction is highly unreliable or if sanction is less effective, trust can be built by 
demanding contract specific investment too. For instance, urban gangs could demand, from 
new potential recruits, the killing of a target or a complete stranger before they could be 
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accepted to the criminal community. The idea of contract specific investment for cooperation 
is a well developed concept when applied to business firms by Williamson (1983). In general 
trust can be built by prediction or initial contract specific investment. If information to make 
prediction is not reliable or if the phenotype is not trustworthy or if information to make 
sanction is not available or if sanction is less effective, demand for initial commitment in 
form of fixed investment will be very effective in order to minimize both adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. This theory will harmonize the cooperative theory of Williamson 
(1983) based on initial commitment with wider theory of trust based literature. See Mezgebo 
(2009) for review of the trust and social capital literature or footnote note 1, below1. 
  
The question we have to ask is can trust based cooperative behaviour invades an environment 
dominated by untrustworthy people and if so, can it be evolutionary stable? Yes and it is a 
well proven fact within institutional economics, under some conditions. If the benefit of 
cooperation is very high, if the future is very important (if the future is not highly 
discounted), if end of the game is unknown and if the cost of information is very high, trust 
based cooperation can spontaneously evolve out of flee market of simple tit-for-tat based 
cooperation (see Fafchamps, 2002). Of course those game theories that are used to prove 
those facts are based on market analysis. But I don’t think market based games are different 
from other biological games in terms of general framework. This is not to deny the need to 
check for evolutionary stability within evolutionary games, but still it is highly unlikely that 
under some conditions trust will fail to invade and to be evolutionary stable.  The difference 
between the stability checked by Fafchamps (2002) and biological evolution used by 
Hamilton and Axelrod (1981) and Axelrod (1984) is that, the first one does not allow inter 
generational analysis. In inter generational games, strategies can inherit their success to next 
generation; where a number of phenotypes or genes in next generations, representing the 
strategy, will be proportional to relative success of the strategy in preceding generation (see 
Axelrod, 1984).    
 
What is the prediction of this hypothesis to nature of human mind?   
 
What does this tell us about the human brain, if those conditions are mate? The implication is 
that it will pay if the human mind evolved in a way that can promote not only the fitness of its 
own genes’ phenotype, but also fitness of other trusted phenotypes, as long as doing so is in 
long term interest of own genes. What does this mean in practice?  
 
What this implies then is that, before going to collective fight people may select the best and 
brave fighters, but once they are in middle of the fight their selfishness has to be give up for 
collective success; simply meaning, they will not try to look who is doing what in order to 
detect moral hazard. Since this will not only split the mind between fight and information 
collection, making the cost of information very high, but also can create mutual suspicion that 
                                                             
1
 Fafchamps and Minten, 1999a, 1999b, 2002; Fafchamps et al., 1994; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004; 
Fafchamps, 1996, 1997, 2002; Gabre­Madhin, 2001a, 2001b; Gabre­Madhin et al., 2003; World Bank, 2002; 
Grootaert, 1998; Overa, 2006; Lyon, 2000; Greif, 1993; Coleman, 1988; Moore, 1999; Kranton, 1996; Barr, 
2000; Harbord, 2006; Palaskas and  Harriss­white, 1993; McMillan and Woodruff, 1998 
9 
 
could lead to chaotic mutual defection. After the fight is over they can easily recollect and 
cross check information unintentionally collected by different group members in middle of 
the fight; which can be used to allocate status and sanction between different group members.  
This will demand a mindset which is more of Freudian (1961) in nature but approached from 
evolutionary psychology and evolutionary cognitive neuron science point of view.  
 
What is needed is the mind that could define itself as essence or soul or goal of life and 
should define its own goal of behaviour independent of other body parts. This is 
commonsense, which was evolutionary impossible up to now. Evidently, the argument 
presented here shows what made human mind what it is now. The question would then be, if 
the mind is nothing but complex punches of culturally expressed commonsense and 
specialized schemes on biologically made operating system and readymade syntaxes adapted 
to our forging ancestries, then how can it define itself? That should be by extending itself to 
the external world since consciousness is nothing but mind’s structured understanding of the 
external world and how it works, but the mind have to understand the world in relation to 
itself only not in relation to the entire body. After all, it is the model of the external world 
which defines what is commonsense and not, what is rational and irrational, what is right and 
wrong, what is moral and immoral. To extend to something implies two things: first self 
definition and second finding goal, values and morality for your life as they are expressed by 
our cultural experiences and expressions.  
 
If one is a supporter of Manchester United football team, the success of the club will be 
understood as one’s personal success and its failure as own personal failure. If one defines 
self as an American, s/he will take pride and high level of satisfaction by successes happening 
in America. This will give us us-verse-them mentality and morality where people can kill 
other groups and can feel no regret but not when they kill someone belonging to their own 
group. Moreover, extended identity defines what is fair, what is moral, what is just and so on. 
This will make complex cooperative systems highly possible and can explain why the mind 
can be very elastic enough to generate human organizational diversity, civilization and 
technology advancements.           
 
However the extension cannot be random because in the long run, it must be evolutionary 
stable at least when competitive pressure was very strict. Biological evolution will limit the 
variations of identity which are feasible in the first place. Second it will also demand status 
associated with high fitness should be allocated to those which sacrifice more fitness to attain 
the identity’s goal. For the first case, it is clear unless an identity can lead to stable fitness in 
the long run, it will end up being corrected by natural selection. Moreover since our operating 
system and different syntaxes used by different schema of the mind are adapted to reality of 
our forging ancestries who operate in highly competitive environment, the human mind will 
reject extended identity if it does not lead to higher fitness as is socially expressed taking all 
relevant cultures in prospective. Let us use human history to contextualize and put a meaning 
to the above hypotheses. 
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Hitler’s racist and collectivist idea was popular when he was winning some battles, when 
unemployment was reduced and when national dignity was on upward trend, but it died fast 
when the trend nosedived. People run away from Cuba but not from China. This is so because 
China is more successful than Cuba in generating better life to its population, given its 
environment and dominance of global materialistic expression of status. Moreover, if one 
allows the definition of the self as an extended identity, say if people overemphasize their 
human identity, they may sacrifice fitness and resources to promote human welfare. If people 
define themselves as naturalistic, i.e., see themselves as part of the natural world, they may 
fight for animal rights and so on.   
 
As stated above in early times since the competitive pressure was very strong and our 
operating system and mental syntaxes were developed at that time, the expression of identity 
will be limited by nature of our mind adapted to that period of time. Moreover at that time it 
was necessary for check and balances to be created between biological instincts and extended 
identity based mental models. This will give us Freudian (1961) ideas of id, ego and super 
ego, which is familiar enough not to demand discussion. If one reinterpret analysis of brain 
chemistry (Wagner, 2009), evolutionary psychology and evolutionary cognitive neuron 
science, from Freudian (1961) id, ego and super ego point of view, ignoring some logic of the 
original author, they are actually highly consistent to each other, but I will not be discussing 
the issue here for sake of brevity.   
    
As competitive pressure is reduced and as organizations (institutions) and technologies are 
able to create excess fitness, behind what is needed for biological fitness, there will be high 
potential for cultural diversity. Those cultural diversities will be reflected not only in 
diversified cultural expression of functional biological fit behaviours but also in the form of 
biological unfit behaviours, like overweight body size which is becoming dominant over 
time. But this will not make culture random even if biological evolution stopped around 10 
000 to 20 000 years ago. This is because every cultural expression will be biologically 
determined behaviour with high random noise added by culture. Biology can be viewed as 
determining the skeleton of culture, while the rest of the flesh is randomly built (if it is 
random at all, which in fact may not be) following the pattern of biology to achieve 
functionality of different degree.      
     
Since the instinct based checks over extended identity, needed to ensure biological fitness in 
long run, are defined under highly competitive environment, they will become less effective 
as civilization progress to make competitive pressure highly insignificant. This could explain 
why people can even have goal of life which does not maximize their fitness and sometimes 
they can even have goal of life that goes against their biological fitness. In addition to 
minimum requirement of survival and reproduction, fitness wise relative success of other 
communities’ and inequality within community could be used as clue to overrule culturally 
defined extended identity by instincts. This in turn will lead to reprogramming of the mind to 
justify the new way of looking at the world as moral, fair and just. The implication being 
what fair reciprocity is will be culturally defined, having alternative culture in the same 
competitive environment as reference point. It also implies those who relatively do worst than 
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others will have tendency to develop antisocial behaviour with internalized morality which 
can justify it. Such behaviour has to be highly correlated with social status, but most 
importantly extreme high correlation should be found with fitness that is survival, 
reproduction and fitness of off springs. The final implication is that social hierarchy, 
inequality and cultural diversity are not result of agriculture based civilization, but actually 
predate agriculture based civilization. The existence of social hierarchy, which is tested by 
existence of differential burial practice with in one community by anthropologists (Haviland 
et al., 2008), actually is culturally biased test to measure the occurrence of social hierarchy 
for all times. My informal observation of Ethiopian Muslims and Christians clearly show that 
the burial sites of Muslims are very homogeneous but not of those Christians. Does this mean 
Muslims are homogeneous group of communists? Or does it imply Christians are rulers and 
Muslims are the slaves? It is clear the commonly used test for incidence of hierarchy is not 
robust for diversified cultural expression of status, especially for time period when 
competitive pressure is very high. Our next focus is to check if we have evidence for such 
evolution. 
 
Possible evidence for evolutionary time period of extended identity  
 
Around 4 Million Years Ago (MYA) with evolution of australopithecines, A. Afarensis (4 – 
2.7 MYA), A. Africanus (3 – 2.2 MYA) and A. Aarhi (2.7 MYA), the brain parts that 
evolved are related to self awareness (ego), self awareness of once behaviour from social 
context (super ego) and capacity to make prediction (Geary 2009). These are everything we 
need for developing trust based independent mindset. What is missing then is something 
which could make cost and benefit analysis ineffective. But evidence for that also exists, 
since following the environmental change from forest to savannah, there is no visible change 
on cognitive side of the mind (see Geary 2009).  In addition bipedal limbs evolved, which 
could reduce the speed of australopithecines but can also improve temperature regulation 
capacity (ibid and Haviland et al., 2008). The problem is why bipedal evolved is not clearly 
answered question in literature (Haviland et al., 2008). Moreover the vision power of 
australopithecines was poorer than other prime mates, which could be explained by their land 
dwelling nature (Geary 2009). I think this hypothesis not only can explain what is changed in 
the head but also what is changed at limps level.  
  
We know australopithecines were from 1.1 meter to 1.6 meter in height and their height did 
increase over time (Pinker 1997 and Geary 2009), which clearly shows in grass land 1 to 2 
meter long (Geary 2009) an animal which is using four limps for moment is highly invisible. 
Especially when they are initially close to 1 meter in height, they will become highly 
invisible in the middle of 1 to 2 meter long grass. Invisibility is advantageous from safety 
point of view but it is also information cost too. Under such reality it would not be possible to 
watch sexual partner or predators all the time to avoid defection and to reduce risk of attack, 
respectively. The problem is not only information is highly costly but also they are less 
adapted to the savannah life after living in the jungle for millions of years. In other words 
their mental schema will not be well adapted to the new environment.      
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Now let’s understand the nature of sexual partnership based on simple tit-for-tat without trust 
and how much trust can improve on it. Naturally the savannah will be abundantly endowed 
with roots, vegetables and other vegetation that women can easily forge. The role of males 
would be providing protection in the form of noticing the appearance of wild predictors, 
which are mostly land dwelling and less understood animals at first, so they can make their 
escape to the nearby tree. The need to watch after female partner and also to make sure the 
female partner is not cheating can be effective, if the male can stand in its two feet  and can 
watch farther. This is advantageous when the savannah is long and vision is weaker following 
increased land dwelling. The role of female is to forge not only for self but also for off 
springs while being under male protection. The problem she faces is collecting information 
about the magnitude of protection her partner is supplying, when he can chase other females. 
Again this can be done better when standing on two feet. Here we have clear imperfect 
information problem that can be addressed either by trust or by spending more fitness on 
information. 
  
To collect information about each other not only they ought to stand in two feet often, being 
exposed to high risk of attack, but need to be closer to each other which increases the risk of 
attack. In other side, male’s warning could be effective, if they could identify the hunter from 
distance to give adequate time for the female with her off springs to escape. This would 
create trade off between quantity (and quality) of information and reduction of risk, which 
increases not only cost of information but also will reduce quality and quantity of information 
collected. Some information has to be ignored since the cost is greater than the benefit in 
terms of fitness. The challenge is not only related to problem of imperfect information but 
also their less adapted mind set in relation to their new environment.        
 
In this setting detection of the right motive is not only highly costly, but can also lead to 
chaotic process of mutual defection. The female cannot easily predict if the male is doing his 
protection job well or not. In the new environment, it is not clear how to predict behaviour 
from outcome with less information and less well developed mental model. The male cannot 
be sure if the female is having sexual relationship with other male or not. Even if she is 
having sexual intercourse, he cannot be sure if she is raped or not.  In this environment trust 
can play big role especially for the male. This is because success rate, in terms of conception 
following sex, is very low and sperm competition can easily reduce the success rate close to 
zero by selecting more trusting and more sperm wise competitive males. For female once 
relationship is started, assuming the male is fit and the original contract specific investment is 
put in place, trust is beneficial to female since she has more to loss by losing the contract. 
That is why trust by minimizing not only cost of information but also the chance of chaotic 
mutual defection can improve outcome of cooperative behaviour.   
 
The problem with sanction is, it is only highly effective when used by males, since he will 
not be making huge initial biological investment and cannot be certain about his fatherhood. 
Male defection is more effective than female defection. As a result, females will demand high 
initial investment as collateral in order to build trust, reducing both adverse selection problem 
before selection and moral hazard problem after selection. Those which are looking for hit 
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and run will not willing to invest in huge initial fixed investment reducing adverse selection. 
At the same time after making huge initial investment, if the female observing the male is not 
trust worthy start cheating or start avoiding him, moving on will become costly by need to 
make new additional investment with new female mate or in the form of raising somebody’s 
children, if he stays.                         
 
In this process standing on two feet could be selected for better vision and easy movement 
within savannah but also in long run it could be effective selection mechanism to differentiae 
the new species from others in making selection of a mate. Any tit-for-tat, with or without 
trust, can do better, if there are clues that can improve prediction about trustworthiness. 
Capacity to walk or stand on two feet could be the needed information until mutations start to 
happen to cheat on trust based cooperation. Prediction will not be based completely on 
bipedal nature since there is issue of initial investment and fitness selection. The advantage of 
trust is that, it will not demand high information content, before trust is built. The female 
does not have to wait until the male can prove he is alpha compared to all potential mates. 
After few fights she could easily make prediction about his behaviour and fitness. This is 
very important since spending a lot of fitness on making initial investment on the open could 
be costly, given they are less adapted to the savannah life and potentially dangerous land 
dwelling predators.    
 
Trust have advantage not only because it can reduce cost of information and can minimize 
cost of mutual chaotic defection but also since it will improve survival rate of new born 
infants and immature infants. In addition when the next round of mating starts they could 
easily use the information of the first round to avoid the first dance all together, which not 
only reduces information cost but also can improve long term investment on all off springs by 
creating kind of nucleolus family which sticks for extended period of time. Those advantages 
can easily compensate for the increased mental processing cost the new mind set demands.  
 
However over time as mutation and deception increase, necessary clues for cheating and 
making cost and benefit analysis can develop. Based on hypotheses presented here, what 
created our mindset is trust or to use emotionally loaded term, love. The first extended 
identity is as result is nucleolus family and the phenotype will promote the welfare of all 
members, without any cost and benefit analysis. However as cheating mutation and the basic 
biological instincts over ride this process in some cases, necessary check and balance will 
evolve over time. Four million years is not only enough to create such check and balances but 
also to make it dominant nature for all humanity. This family based extended identity can be 
slowly extended in wider dimensions to create different complex organizations in both 
prehistory and then after. What is the implication of this hypothesis to our understanding of 
both human evolution and analysis of humanity is given below; of course assuming it is true.    
     
Implication for both natural sciences and humanities  
 
Let us kick off this section by deciphering the implications of the hypotheses presented in this 
paper. It is arguable that a conscious mind is an advanced prime-mate mind which can create 
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extended identity only; but it is certain the nature of a conscious mind includes capacity to 
create extended identity. We cannot even be certain enough if consciousness is a human thing 
only and since it should be built in cumulative manner, some traces of it should be found in 
other ‘smart’ animals too.    
    
The existence of extended identity is an important foundation stone for human technological 
and institutional (organizational) advancement. Humans can spend years trying to develop 
new technology or in search of scientific truth, even at the cost of fitness. This is possible 
because they can extend themselves to their scientific discovery, knowledge and/or products. 
Human beings can extend themselves not only to social life, technology and arts but also to 
super natural powers and entities. Moreover, since the mental program defines itself not only 
to external social reality but also to, biological stable rules which are elastically expressed in 
form of, social morality, common sense and idea of justice and fairness that come with it for 
organizational purpose, it can easily use internalize morality to restrain the self from 
defection. Those facts will clearly reconcile evolutionary analysis with well accepted theories 
of conventional psychology and humanity. Now let’s turn toward institutional and 
organizational analysis, which is my area of interest.         
 
Trust is basic to any organization. Trust could be micro based which is built through personal 
life experience; It could be defined at meso level developed based on statistical 
discrimination; or it could be macro in nature which is based on trust on organizational 
system (Dore, 1983, Fafchamps, 2002). But as cost of information declines and as benefit of 
cooperation become less dominant in relation to cost of being a sucker, the role of trust will 
decline and other methods of organizational and institutional structure will develop to make 
cooperation possible. But in all organizations some level of trust is involved because any 
contract is always incomplete and any formal law or informal norm is always vaguely defined 
to allow flexibility (Klein et al., 1978). Fortunately, trust opened a new dimension of 
evolution that is organizational (institutional) and technological in nature. With some 
redefinition of production technology as software, we can present the idea by evolution of 
institutions. Intuition of the author is that evolution of institutions that is organizational and 
technological in nature is actually happening within humanity. Once we approach it from this 
angle, we could say it is Cultural Evolution; but what are evolving are specific institutions not 
cultures in general. As biological evolution implies evolution of selfish and fit gene, Cultural 
Evolution could imply evolution of selfish and fit institutions. For sake of brevity and in 
order to avoid going out of context the discussion about institutions will stop here. 
 
Turning toward the over politicized debate, it is clear, if the hypothesis presented is right, 
social scientists did not behave rationally to address scientific issue through scientific 
method. Whether we like it or not, truth is truth and if it needs approval of a mob, it will not 
be truth after all. As it is stated by Nietzsche (1886) if truth is frugal enough to need 
someone’s protection, it is nothing but mere opinion. Even if hypothesis or idea is very 
dangerous, the best way to address the problem is to find ways that can lead to the discovery 
of the truth. At the same time those who come from natural side of evolution do tend to over 
conclude on human nature without having all the facts. The hypotheses proposed in this paper 
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may be right or wrong, but there is no doubt biological evolution by itself cannot explain 
much of human behaviour as it stands. We need to allow for cultural and institutional 
expression of biological adaption and their variation, if we are going to understand human 
behaviour and human nature.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In general, extended identity is part of the extended phenotype, but flexible enough to 
accommodate different organizational structures and their dynamics. Say one works in big 
company. To get his/her salary and associated fitness a cooperative effort of everyone is 
needed. As result the entire company would be his/her genes’ phenotype. To make it worst 
one’s gene phenotype may include the entire world, since different things happening in 
different part of the world may influence one’s fitness in cooperative manner. Such thinking 
is possible, but will be less useful and impractical. That is why in case of humans, we need to 
think in terms of goals which are based on extended identity and organizational (institutional) 
structures built as complex and diversified expression of biological evolution stable 
behaviours. After all we are not just animals but also highly intelligent and mentally complex 
animal. 
 
Before this research paper is concluded, some important limitations of the above analysis are 
given below. The existence of extended identity with in humanity is less disputable, since it is 
simply impossible to find a single human being without extended social identity. However it 
could be disputable, if it’s specific time of evolution is 4 MYA. To be conclusive there is 
need to tress the mind set of every specie that branched toward current humanity since 4 
MYA. Given lack of data, it was not possible to do so in this research. In addition necessary 
predictions need to be developed and checked against data, before anyone can clearly accept 
the above hypothesis.     
 
Given family is the most beneficial organization in terms of fitness and biological altruism, 
given it is the simplest and foundation stone of any other organization, and given it is based 
on time wise very extended form of cooperation that could make such mind set very effective 
and fit, it is highly possible the evolution of extended identity has to happen in form of family 
based cooperation. However, this conclusion again needs to be proven or other explanation 
need to be found. It is our hope farther research will clarify those points, if we stop the 
political bickering, if we return to scientific analysis and if we are able to integrate different 
disciplines in to one common scientific analysis with many integrated branches.                
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